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THE NEWLY FOUND "COMPASSION'' FOR 
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: CIVIL 
COMMITMENT AND THE RIGHT TO 
TREATMENT IN THE WAKE OF KANSAS V. 
HENDRICKS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Society has long dealt with perpetrators of sexual violence 
differently from persons accused of other crimes. Why are sex 
offenders singled out? Do we fear harm from sexual perpetrators 
so much more than harm from murderers, robbers, or drunk 
drivers? Perhaps so, as these criminals attack victims so personal-
ly and intimately; victims of sexual assault and counselors of 
victims have copiously documented experiences of abuse and 
recovery in psychological and popular literature.1 Are sex offend-
ers really any more "sick" or "deviant" than other criminals who 
step outside behavioral norms established by our criminal laws?2 
Perhaps society's discomfort with sexuality in general, and with 
sexual deviance in particular, explains the unique approach to 
sexual perpetrators.3 These competing motivations, on the one 
1 See, e.g., ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAir-A GUIDE FOR WOMEN 
SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1988) (describing self-help strategy nnd recounting 
survivors' stories); LisA MANSHEL, NAP TIME (1990) (recounting ordeal of bringing child 
abuser to justice); GLADYS DENNY SHULTZ, How :MANY MORE VIC'IThi:s? SOCIETY' AND THE SEX 
CRThnNAL (1965) (relating personal experience of sexual assnult nnd proposing societnl 
solutions); NEIL WEINER & SHARON E. RoBINSON KURPIS, SHA'ITERED .INNOCENCE-A 
PRACTICE GUIDE FOR COUNSELING WOMEN SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (1995) (describing 
psychological effects of abuse and treatment strategies). 
2 John Monahan & Sharon Kantorowski Davis, Menlally Disordered Sex Offenders, in 
MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 191, 191 
(John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1983) (describing Californin legislative hearing 
on sex offender commitment statute where legislator's comment thnt •any se.--c offender is 
mentally messed up, so let's lock the SOBs up and get on with the business of the other 
people of California" elicited resounding applause (emphasis in original)). 
3 C. Peter Erlinder, Minr=ota's Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the "Politically RI," 19 
WAL MITCHELL L. REv. 99, 158 (1993) (relying on James Mndison's formulntion that the 
majority will use its power to disadvantage of persons it finds "most obno.--cious• nnd 
suggesting that society finds sexual predators "obnoxious•); Stephen J. Morse, Blame and 
Danger: An Essay on Preventative Detentwn, 76 B.U. L. REv. 113, 134 (1996) (noting that 
many people cannot fathom deviant sexual behavior so they tend to think something must 
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hand to protect society from harm inflicted by sex offenders, and on 
the other hand to correct the perceived deviance of perpetrators, 
account for the divergent legal approaches to this class of offenders. 
Given society's demonstrated abhorrence of sexual deviants, 
however, any suggestion that sex offender laws are enacted out of 
an altruistic interest in "care and treatment" of sexual offenders is 
inherently insincere.4 
In order to address public demands for safety,5 state legislatures 
have devised a variety of approaches regarding sex offenders, 
particularly addressing concerns of reoffense or recidivism. 6 
Several states have enacted community registration and notifica-
tion laws, or "Megan's Laws."7 In some states, judges can commit 
persons convicted of sex crimes to a sex offender treatment program 
prior to or as a part of sentencing.8 Other states allow separate 
civil commitment hearings for convicted sex offenders who have 
reached the end of their prison sentences but whom the state still 
considers dangerous. 9 
be wrong with sexual deviants); Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators: 
Community Notification and Civil Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 405, 416 (1997) (noting psychoanalytic theories of 1930s advocated "treatment" 
of sexual deviants). 
4 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated 422 U.S. 563 (1975) 
("To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement 
is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates tho 
very fundamentals of due process."). 
6 Morse, supra note 3, at 116 (noting that absolute safety is impossible without drastic 
intrusions on individual liberty). 
6 See, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1993) (noting that Community 
Protection Act of 1990 was passed in response to citizens' concerns regarding recidivist sex 
offenders, particularly one recent sexual attack on young Tacoma boy); see also Morse, supra 
note 3, at 139 (casting doubt on assumption that sexual offenders are more likely to reoffend 
than other types of criminals). 
7 E.g., O.C.G.A. § 42-9-44.1 (1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:546(A) (West Supp. 1998); 
Miss. CODE ANN.§§ 45-33-17, -19 (Supp.1997); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-32-15 (1997); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 40-39-106 (1997); see Teir & Coy, supra note 3, at 405-06 (referring to Now 
Jersey case ofMegan Kanlm, seven-year-old girl raped and killed by man with record ofsox 
offenses); Dale Russakoff, Out of Grief Comes a Legislative Force: From Megan's Laws to 
Jimmy's and Jenna's, WASH. POST, June 15, 1998, at Al (describing trend of"memorial laws" 
named after juvenile victims of violent crimes). 
8 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (West 1998) (providing for commitment in 
lieu of sentencing); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8 (West 1992) (allowing indefinite 
commitment as substitute for prosecution). 
9 In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn. 1996) (affirming civil commitment of fifty-
four-year-old sex offender under "sexually dangerous persons" act who spent most of his life 
in criminal justice system). 
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The Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks10 recently upheld 
just such a post-sentencing commitment statute. The statute was 
premised on concerns for public safety and crime prevention, 11 but 
nominally suggested a state objective of "care and treatment" of sex 
offenders.12 The Supreme Court in Hendricks, however, did not 
squarely resolve the issue of whether the state must actually 
provide treatment to persons committed as sexually violent 
offenders in order to justify the confinement.13 Unless treatment 
is provided, sex offenders committed under statutes such as 
Kansas's are locked away under the pretense ofrehabilitation, with 
no real possibility of release. Thus, if a state deprives an individu-
al's liberty for a rehabilitative purpose, it must provide treatment 
to effectuate that rehabilitation.14 If states do not provide treat-
ment, they reveal their true legislative purpose as ensuring safety 
to the public at large rather than caring for the "sick" offender. 
The nod to "treatment" in the language of sex offender statutes, 
such as in the Kansas Act, fails to save such acts from constitution-
al challenges of impermissible preventative detention unless states 
provide treatment.15 
lO 117 s. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1997). 
11 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (describing sexual offenders ns "extremely 
dangerous," noting high likelihood ofreoffense, and pledging need for legislature to address 
"risk"). 
12 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (noting that legislature established Act to provide "care 
and treatment of the sexually violent predator"). 
13 The majority in Hendricks dodged the treatment issue on alternative grounds, first 
suggesting that the Court has "never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly 
detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to 
others." Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084. Second, the Court suggested that the Kansns 
Supreme Court's decision could be read as concluding that Hendricks' condition was treatable 
and that the state had provided "meager" treatment. Id. at 2085. In dissent, Justice Breyer, 
joined by Justices Stevens and Souter and Justice Ginsberg in part, noted that the case did 
not require the Court to decide if treatment is always required ns a part of commitment, that 
is, whether an untreatable, mentally ill, and dangerous person could be civilly committed. 
Id. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
14 Paul Holland & Wallace J. 1flyniec, Whateuer Happened to the Right to Treatment?: 
The Modem Quest for a Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791, 1792 (1995) (describing 
right to treatment argument in relation to juvenile detainees). 
15 State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 135-36 (W15, 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (joining 
many judges from Wisconsin and other jurisdictions who have found that similar statutes 
create unconstitutional preventative detention); Morse, supra note 3, at 135 (noting that civil 
commitment of sexual predators is unjustified and does little to enhance public safety). 
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In light of heart-wrenching stories of sexual abuse and public 
demands for safety, the Hendricks case presented the Supreme 
Court with compelling facts on which to uphold the Kansas 
commitment strategy. After all, the statute prevented the release 
of a man whose history of sex crimes, incarceration, and institution-
alization spanned nearly two decades, and who admitted he still 
had sexual desires for children but could not control his urges. 16 
Faced with that evidence, the Court would have been hard-pressed 
to strike down the Kansas statute by finding that such a predator 
received inadequate treatment for his disorder, or that perhaps he 
could never be treated effectively.17 Nevertheless, this Note will 
argue that the issue of treatment of sexual offenders committed to 
psychiatric facilities cannot, on a constitutional level, and should 
not, on a policy level, be so readily dismissed. 
Part II of this Note will review the constitutional requirements 
of civil commitment generally as outlined by the Supreme Court 
and interpreted by lower courts, particularly in reference to 
commitment of sexual offenders.18 Part III will examine the 
constitutionality of civil commitment statutes drafted particularly 
for sex offenders.19 Part IV will take a closer look at the legal 
issues regarding treatment as an element of civil commitment of 
sex offenders. 20 Part V will examine the appropriateness of 
confining so-called sexually dangerous persons under a treatment 
model, and will conclude that the purported state objective of 
providing treatment is disingenuous and a facade for the true 
16 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Kan. 1996) (describing Hendricks's testimony 
stating that he first exposed himself to two girls in 1955 and spent almost half his life in 
prison or psychiatric institutions), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 
(1997); Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2074 (describing testimony where Hendricks agreed ho is a 
pedophile, is not cured, and cannot control his urges when "stressed out"). 
17 Hendricks himself told a psychologist at the state security hospital that "treatment was 
bullshit." In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 143 (Larson, J., dissenting); see also Leading Cases, 
Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 111 HARV. L REv. 259, 266 (1997) 
(noting that Hendricks may be read narrowly in light of its "peculiar factual circumstance" 
but likely will be applied as extension of states' civil commitment powers); see, e.g., In re 
Haga, 943 P.2d 395, 397 (Wash. 1997) (rejecting Raga's constitutional challenges in cursory 
discussion based on Supreme Court holding identical Kansas statute constitutional in 
Hendricks). 
16 See infra notes 23-50 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 51-84 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 85-180 and accompanying text. 
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objective of indefinitely detaining a particularly disfavored class of 
criminals.21 Finally, Part VI will examine more principled alter-
natives available to state legislatures facing the problem of se}..'Ual 
violence. 22 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR GENERAL 
CIVIL COMMITMENT STATUTES 
Civil commitment statutes for sexual offenders are derivations of 
general civil commitment statutes in most states which authorize 
involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill persons.23 Involuntary 
commitment to a psychiatric facility violates an individual's 
constitutionally protected liberty interest.2"1 Such interference is 
constitutionally permissible, however, if the individual is both 
dangerous and mentally ill.25 The state must prove both elements 
to continue the confinement. 
A state cannot involuntarily commit a mentally ill individual who 
is not dangerous. The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson 
established the right of a mentally ill individual who poses no 
danger to himself or others to live freely in the community.26 In 
that case, the state had confined Donaldson to a state hospital for 
fifteen years based on a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Over 
the years, Donaldson repeatedly, though unsuccessfully requested 
release, arguing that he was not mentally ill, or even if he was, 
that the hospital was not providing treatment for his illness.27 
21 See infra notes 181-223 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 224-240 and accompanying text. 
23 States explicitly recognize that their general civil commitment laws do not reach the 
alleged "sexually violent predators" and draft sex offender statutes with that fact in mind. 
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (describing sexual predators ns dangerous, but 
lacking "mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment 
pursuant to [general involuntary commitment statute)"). 
24 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (noting that involuntary commitment 
involves "massive curtailment of liberty"). 
25 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2075 (1997) ("[TJhis Court hns sustained a 
commitment statute if it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, 
such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality'"); Addington v. Te.'W.S, 441 U.S. 418, 433 
(1979) (holding that state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that individual is 
both mentally ill and dangerous). 
26 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
zr Id. at 565-66. 
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The hospital superintendent maintained that although Donaldson 
was not dangerous to himself or others, the state could continue to 
confine him because he was mentally ill and would have difficulty 
adjusting to life outside the hospital.28 The Supreme Court, 
however, rejected that argument and held that concerns about a 
mentally ill person's standard of living in the community or the 
public's reactions to his eccentricities were insufficient to overcome 
Donaldson's fundamental liberty interest.29 
Likewise, a state generally cannot infringe an individual's liberty 
interest merely by demonstrating the person is dangerous. The 
Supreme Court has refused to allow civil confinement of individuals 
who are not mentally ill but who nevertheless pose a danger to 
themselves or others except under narrow circumstances. Based on 
that principle, two individuals in United States v. Salerno30 
challenged their pretrial detentions under the Bail Reform Act of 
1984. 31 The state had detained the challengers on multiple 
charges including Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act violations, mail and wire fraud, extortion and various criminal 
gambling violations.32 The Court rejected the challengers' due 
process claim and upheld the pretrial detention scheme for 
individuals arrested for serious crimes. In such cases, the state 
need not show the detainee is mentally ill because of the compelling 
government interest as well as the specific, identifiable threat to 
the public. 33 
28 Id. at 567-68. 
29 Id. at 575 ("[T]he mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from 
preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. • . • Mere public intolerance or 
animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty."). But 
cf. John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 
BUFF. L. REv. 499,535 (1981) (advocating for commitment on finding of mental illness alone, 
in narrow situations, rather than forcing state "to abandon many citizens affiicted with 
serious mental illness to a lifetime of abject suffering based on a conclusive presumption of 
rational choice"). 
30 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). 
31 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1994); see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741 (describing Act as allowing 
federal courts to detain arrestee pending trial if government demonstrates that it cannot 
arrange for release of suspect in manner that would assure safety of community and others). 
32 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 743. 
33 Id. at 750-51 (discussing government's interest in preventing crime by arrestees and 
congressional finding that serious offenders are likely to commit dangerous acts in tho 
community after arrest). 
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The Court in Foucha v. Louisiana,34 however, refused to sustain 
post-sentence civil commitment on the basis of dangerousness 
alone. In that case, the state initially committed Foucha on a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.35 Foucha was tried for 
burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.36 After four years of 
confinement, the court reviewed Foucha's condition.37 Doctors 
testified that Foucha's mental illness was in remission, but that he 
had an "antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental 
disease and that is untreatable."38 As to the element of danger-
ousness, one doctor equivocally testified that he would not "feel 
comfortable" certifying that Foucha would not be a danger to 
himself or others.39 The Court nevertheless rejected Foucha's 
continued confinement and distinguished the Salerno federal 
confinement scheme from the Louisiana commitment statute. The 
Bail Reform Act was carefully limited in its application and 
afforded ample procedural protections, while the Louisiana scheme 
broadly permitted indefinite confinement and placed the burden of 
proving lack of dangerousness on the patient himself.40 
The Foucha decision resulted in considerable confusion and 
disparate interpretation by lower courts addressing the mental 
illness element of civil commitment.41 The Supreme Court has 
never clearly articulated a definition of "mental illness" that passes 
constitutional muster,42 instead deferring to legislative judgments 
~ 504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992). 
35 Id. at 74. 
35 Id. at 73. 
37 Id. at 74. 
38 Id. at 75. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 81-82. The Louisiana statute provided for commitment to a psychiatric hospital 
of defendants deemed not guilty by reason of insanity. Either the hospital or the acquittee 
could initiate release proceedings. If the court recommended release, the state held a 
bearing to assess dangerousness. If the patient failed to prove be was not dangerous, the 
court ordered him returned to the institution. Id. at 73. 
n See John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of 
Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1312-16 (1996) (describing lower courts' 
treatment of Supreme Court precedent and outlining standards for civil commitment). 
~ State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 123 (Wis. 1995) (noting that Supreme Court has used 
numerous terms to describe mental condition of persons subject to civil commitment}; 
Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the Inuoluntary Commitment of 
Sexually Violent Predators-A Due Process Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 638 (1997) 
(noting that Supreme Court bas not defined term "mental illness•). 
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to define psychological conditions that justify commitment.43 
Despite the detailed discussion of mental condition and commit-
ment in Foucha, that opinion provides lower courts with limited 
guidance. Justice O'Connor's concurrence with the four-Justice 
Foucha plurality further obscures the constitutional requirement. 
Justice O'Connor noted that a state might constitutionally commit 
an acquittee, such as Foucha, who had regained sanity, if the 
detention were narrowly tailored to a state interest and if there 
were a "medical justification.»44 
Lower cop.rts might interpret Foucha as holding that some, but 
not all, mental conditions may be classified as "mental illness" for 
the purpose of civil commitment.45 The difficulty state legisla-
tures face is in drawing that line. Some states have interpreted 
Foucha to stand for the proposition that "antisocial personality 
disorder" is not a mental illness per se and thus cannot sustain 
commitment. 46 At least one court, through some careful hair-
splitting, rejected a challenge to the statutory language of"person-
ality disorder" by suggesting that the objectionable term in Foucha 
was "antisocial personality."47 Other courts have relied on Foucha 
43 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983) (noting that "courts should pay 
particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments"); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017 
(Wash. 1993) (noting need for deference given uncertainty of psychiatric diagnoses); Androw 
Hammel, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil Commitment Laws and the 
Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 Hous. L. REv. 775, 795 (1995) (noting that O'Connor's 
concurrence in Foucha advocated judicial deference to legislative judgment). 
« Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that dotontion 
narrowly tailored in nature and duration to public safety concerns, which Louisiana schomo 
was not, might be permissible but rejecting dissenters' view that acquittees could bo 
"confined as mental patients absent some medical justification for doing so"). 
45 See Erlinder, supra note 3, at 141 (describing possible interpretations of holding in 
Foucha). 
46 E.g., Youngv. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,750 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (relying on Foucha in 
holding that "mere presence of antisocial personality, or other personality disordor falling 
short of mental illness, is constitutionally insufficient to support indefinite confinomont"), 
47 In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1006-07 n.12 (noting that "personality disorder" is a 
recognized mental disorder, whereas "antisocial personality" was labeled "Condition Not 
Attributable to a Mental Disorder" (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-ill-R (3d ed. rev. 1987)). "Antisocial 
personality disorder," however, is considered a mental disorder in the current DSM-IV. 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: 
DSM-IV (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Because of the difficulty in precisely describing 
mental illnesses, as well as the changing definitions even among professionals, courts 
generally do not rely on the DSM as conclusive authority. See, e.g., In re Linehan, 557 
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to afford legislatures broad discretion in defining the mental 
condition of individuals subject to civil commitment.48 
The elasticity of the mental illness requirement as defined in 
Foucha has found particular favor with courts construing sexual 
predator statutes. Such statutes typically provide broad definitions 
of "mental disorder" or "mental abnormality" rather than specific 
medical definitions of "mental illness.n-19 Thus, the manner in 
which a state defines the mental condition that will support 
commitment is significant in deciding whether treatment must also 
be an element of the confinement.60 
III. CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS 
The sex offender commitment statute upheld in Hendricks, 
patterned after a Washington statute,61 encompasses the tradi-
tional elements of mental illness and dangerousness required for 
civil commitment but is specially tailored to the target population. 
The state can commit an individual deemed a "sexually violent 
predator," which is a person (a) convicted or charged with (b) a 
sexually violent offense (c) who suffers from a mental abnormality 
or personality disorder (d) which makes the person likely to engage 
N.W.2d 171, 176-77 (Minn. 1996) (describing dispute between experts regarding diagnostic 
categories of mental illness as defined by DSM); Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1321-22 
(describing difficulty of reliance on DSM due to multiple revisions). The DSM is a 
standardized nomenclature of mental disorders developed by a team of physicians and 
designed for use by clinicians and researchers. DSM-IV at xv-xvii 
48 State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 123 (WIS. 1995) ("The [Supreme] Court bas wisely left 
the job of creating statutory definitions to the legislators who draft state lnws"). The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court also cited Justice O'Connor's concurrence on "medicnljustification" 
for commitment, concluding that continuing treatment aimed at reducing a patient's 
dangerousness provided such justification. Id. at 127-28. 
49 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080-81 (1997) (•Contrary to Hendricks' 
assertion, the term 'mental illness' is devoid of any talismanic significance. • • • Indeed, we 
have never required State legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil 
commitment statutes."). 
50 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992) (finding Foucha suffered from 
condition that was not mental illness and was not treatable). 
51 WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 71.09.010-.090 (1992 & West Supp. 1998); see also In re Hendricks, 
912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996) (noting that 1994 Kansas statute followed Washington 
scheme). 
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in acts of sexual violence.52 In addition to these substantive ele-
ments, the Act provides various procedural requirements for 
commitment. 
The Kansas procedure for commitment and release is as follows: 
Just before an inmate is due for release, the prosecuting attorney 
presents the defendant to the judge to show probable cause that the 
criminal is a sexually violent predator.53 On finding probable 
cause, the judge orders the individual transferred to an appropriate 
facility for professional evaluation.54 To commit the individual, 
the state then must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil trial 
that the individual is a sexually violent predator.55 If that burden 
is met, the person is transferred to a mental health treatment 
facility.56 On the basis of an annual review57 or on the recom-
mendation of the hospital superintendent, 58 the court can order 
release after a hearing to determine whether the person's mental 
abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit 
predatory acts of sexual violence if released. The state still bears 
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the individu-
al is not safe to be at large and likely will engage in acts of sexual 
violence if released. 59 
Sex offender commitment statutes have faced an array of 
constitutional challenges, all of which the Supreme Court rejected 
in Hendricks.60 One series of challenges raised by alleged sexually 
62 Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 132 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996)); 
see also Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional 
Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 187-88 (1996) (describing 
elements of sex offender commitment schemes as (1) past conduct, (2) mental disorder, and 
(3) likelihood of future harm). 
63 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04 (1994 & Supp. 1996); see also Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 132-
33 (outlining statutory scheme for commitment and release). Other states provide different 
criteria and procedures for commitment. A comparative survey of those statutes is beyond 
the scope of this Note, but elements of other approaches will be discussed more specifically 
regarding the issue of treatment. The Kansas statute is illustrative of civil commitment 
schemes generally and is of particular significance after the Supreme Court's ruling on its 
constitutionality in Kansas u. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). 
64 Id. § 59-29a05. 
65 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06-a07(a). 
66 Id. § 59-29a07. 
67 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08. 
68 Id. § 59-29al0. 
69 Id. 
60 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076 ("Hendricks challenged his commitment on, inter alia, 
'substantive' due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds."). 
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dangerous persons rests on procedural due process grounds. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that commitment to a mental 
hospital produces "a massive curtailment of liberty"61 which thus 
requires due process protection.62 The Kansas statute, however, 
overcomes the various procedural due process flaws of earlier 
commitment statutes. First, the statute requires a hearing (before 
a jury if demanded) both for initial commitment and for subsequent 
release. 63 Second, the individual facing commitment has a right 
to counsel. 64 Third, the Kansas scheme requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the individual is a sexually dangerous 
person, a standard exceeding the clear and convincing evidence 
standard required for general civil commitments.65 Finally, the 
Kansas statute places the burden of proof on the state66 rather 
than on the person facing commitment. This provision overcomes 
one of the flaws in the Louisiana statute rejected in Foucha.61 
These provisions in the Kansas statute comply with Supreme Court 
precedent on due process in civil commitment.68 
States enacting sex offender commitment schemes also face 
substantive due process challenges. "This Court repeatedly has 
recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
61 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). 
62 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). 
63 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a06, 59-29al0. 
6' Id. § 59-29a06. 
65 Id. § 59-29a10; see also Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-31 (evnlunting merits of higher and 
lower standards in light of individual's deprivation ofliberty, state's interest in commitment, 
and uncertainty of psychiatric diagnosis). 
66 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29al0. 
67 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (noting thnt under statute state carries 
burden to prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and 
dangerous" (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983))); see also supra notes 
34-44 and accompanying text (discussing problems with statute in Foucha). 
68 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980) (requiring procedurnl due process 
protections, including notice, hearing, opportunity to present witnesses, independent 
decisionmaker, statement ofreasons, and availability of counsel for transfer of prison inmnte 
to mental hospital); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (holding that due process 
requires full hearing with presence of counsel, right to confront witnesses, and right to 
present evidence for person committed as sex offender in lieu ofincnrcerotion); Bnxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966) (finding equal protection violation becnuse general civil 
commitments require judicial review before jury, but statute under review nllowed post-
sentence commitment only on administrative andjudicial ruling that individual "mny require 
care and treatment"). 
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significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protec-
tion. "69 An individual's liberty interest is important and funda-
mental but can be subordinated to compelling state interests, 
addressed by narrowly drawn laws.70 Substantive due process 
claims are pivotal to the issue of the right to treatment because of 
the justifications states rely on for depriving the liberty of sexually 
dangerous persons. 
In the context of civil commitment, the Supreme Court has 
established as a matter of due process that "the nature and 
duration of commitment must bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed."71 The two state 
purposes most commonly asserted to justify civil commitment are 
protection of society under the state's police power and protection 
of an incompetent individual under the parens patriae power.72 
Under their police powers, states have authority to ensure public 
health and safety by protecting the community from persons who 
are dangerous.73 Accordingly, a state may incapacitate an individ-
ual because a dangerous person's liberty interest is outweighed by 
the government objective of preventing harm to others74 and 
preserving an organized society.75 Police power is a particularly 
salient justification for commitment of sexual offenders who are 
perceived as extremely dangerous.76 
69 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425. 
70 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987) (recognizing "importance and 
fundamental nature" of person's liberty interest which must be balanced against "greater 
needs of society"); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1000 (Wash. 1993) (describing "strict scrutiny 
test" for state laws that impinge on fundamental rights). 
71 Jones, 463 U.S. at 368 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S, 715, 738 (1972)). 
72 See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (noting that state has legitimate interest under 
parens patriae and police powers); Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of 
the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus o{Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
1 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL 'y & L. 161, 183 (1995) ("Civil commitment statutes reflect tho state's 
police power and parens patriae authority."). 
73 Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. 
74 State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 128 (Wis. 1995) ("The balance can favor danger-
preempting confinement under proper circumstances"); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 919 
n.2 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting) (describing legislative intent to "make possible tho 
control of dangerously psychopathic persons without having to wait for them to commit a 
shocking crime"). 
75 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) ("In determining whether a substantive 
right protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to balance 'the 
liberty of the individual' and 'the demands of an organized society.' " (citation omitted)). 
76 See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1993) (noting legislature determined 
"exceptional risks" of sexual predators justified special civil commitment statute). 
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Parens patriae traditionally referred to states' paternalistic 
protection of juveniles, 77 but the power also extends to protection 
of other disabled or incompetent persons, including mentally ill 
individuals.78 Under parens patriae power, states' interest in civil 
commitment is to provide care and treatment to citizens who are 
unable to care for themselves. 79 In exercising its parens patriae 
power, a state acts in the best interests of the persons it seeks to 
protect.80 In civil commitment, the "best interest" of the afflicted 
individual is to provide care and treatment in order to rehabilitate 
-him so that he can successfully reenter society.81 
Alleged sex offenders also challenge commitment statutes under 
the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.82 
In defense of such claims, a state must demonstrate that the 
commitment is civil and non-punitive in nature.83 In the face of 
such a challenge, a demonstration by the state that the intent and 
effect of the commitment scheme is to treat, rather than to punish, 
becomes particularly compelling.84 Thus, a state may premise its 
commitment statute on treatment in order to rebut constitutional 
challenges but may, in fact, have no actual interest in improving 
the welfare of persons it commits as sexually violent predators. 
77 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing origins of juvenile justice system); 
Julian W. :Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 104-05 (1909) (noting power of 
court of chancery to intervene in best interests of child). 
78 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47 (defining pnrens patriae ns state acting as 
"the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics"); Gilbert T. Venable, Note, The 
Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juuenile Court Powers, 
27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 894, 895 (1966) (describing origin of parens patriae ns English King's 
power to protect children and "idiots"). 
79 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). 
80 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (describing due process limits on 
curtailment of individual liberty interest under parens patriae power). 
81 See, e.g., Cameron v. Walsh, No. 95-10904-PBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11691, at *19 
(D. Mass. July 23, 1996) (describing legislative purpose behind sexunl predator act in 
response to challenge that statute was aimed at punishment rather than treatment); M. 
CherifBassiouni, The Right of the Mentally m to Cure and Treatment: Medical Due Process, 
15 DEPAUL L. REv. 291, 300 (1966) (noting that commitment on parens patriae grounds is 
to "care, treat and restore [the mentally ill individual) to a useful role in society"). 
82 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (1997) (rejecting ex post facto and 
double jeopardy claims). 
83 E.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 996-97 (Wash. 1993) (considering whether legislature 
intended statute as civil and whether effect of statute is so punitive ns to negate that intent). 
84 Id. at 997 (finding Washington statute civil rather than criminnl because it "focused 
on treating petitioners for a current mental abnormality"). 
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IV. TREATMENT AS AN ELEMENT OF SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT 
In sex offender commitment acts, states may use treatment as a 
"hook" on which the commitment scheme can be found constitution-
al, even though they have no real interest in actually "caring for'' 
sexually violent predators. For example, the Kansas statute at 
issue in Hendricks contains incongruous statements suggesting that 
the legislature premised the statute on care and treatment but 
lacked any actual intention to provide such treatment to sex 
offenders.85 The Kansas Supreme Court, in adjudging the state 
statute unconstitutional, offered a similar critique: "It is clear that 
the overriding concern of the legislature is to continue the segrega-
tion of sexually violent offenders from the public. Treatment with 
the goal of reintegrating them into society is incidental at best. 
The record reflects that treatment for sexually violent predators is 
all but nonexistent."86 
The Hendricks case involved a challenge to the Kansas Sexually 
Violent Predator Act of 199487 brought by Leroy Hendricks. 
Hendricks pied guilty in 1984 to two counts of indecent liberties 
with two thirteen-year-old boys and was serving a five to twenty-
year sentence.88 In 1994, Hendricks was scheduled for release to 
a halfway house, but the state filed a petition to commit Hendricks 
as a sexually violent predator under the Act.89 Hendricks chal-
lenged the petition on various factual and procedural grounds and 
further suggested the Act was unconstitutional.90 At trial, Hend-
ricks testified that he was sixty-years-old and that his history of 
sexual involvement with children began in 1955, when he exposed 
himself to two girls. 91 Hendricks further described himself as a 
pedophile who could not control his urges to molest children and 
admitted he was not cured of the condition. 92 A psychologist 
85 See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (describing inconsistent languago in 
Kansas act). . 
86 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v. Hondricks, 
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). 
87 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). 
88 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (1996); In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130. 
89 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078. 
90 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 130. 
91 Id. at 130-31. 
92 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078-79; In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. 
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testified for the state, asserting that he did not believe Hendricks 
was mentally ill or had a personality disorder, but concluding that 
Hendricks was a pedophile, which the doctor believed satisfied the 
definition of "mental abnormality" in the statute.93 A jury deter-
mined beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks was a sexually 
violent predator and ordered him committed to the Larned State 
Hospital.94 Hendricks challenged the ruling in part on evidence 
that the hospital had no treatment program in place for sexually 
violent predators.95 Nevertheless, the Court denied his motion to 
dismiss, or in the alternative for a new trial, and Hendricks was 
transferred to the hospital. 96 
Hendricks subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for 
certiorari under the due process, ex post facto, and double jeopardy 
clauses of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court heard the 
case but rejected all ofHendricks's challenges and held the Kansas 
Act constitutional.97 Hendricks's due process challenge turned on 
the statutory definition of "mental abnormality."98 The Court 
relied on Foucha99 to hold that a statute is not required to specify 
"mental illness" per se100 and held that Kansas' statutory defini-
tion sufficed for due process purposes.101 
The Court also considered Hendricks's claimed right to treatment 
on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds, both of which require 
a non-punitive statutory purpose.102 The Kansas legislature, 
however, did not clearly identify a non-punitive purpose. Instead 
it expressed the state purpose in two inconsistent statements. The 
legislature explained its rationale in seeking a special commitment 
93 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. 
94 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079; In re Hendricks 912 P.2d at 131. 
95 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. 
96 Id. 
97 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076, 2098. 
98 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (" 'Mental nbnormnlity' means n 
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which 
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such 
person a menace to the health and safety of others."); Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079. 
!l9 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that 
"medical justification" authorizes commitment). 
100 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080. 
101 Id. at 2081. 
102 Id. at 2082. 
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strategy for sexually violent offenders103 in the preamble to the 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act:104 On the one hand, the 
legislature noted that sexual predators generally have disorders 
which are "unamenable to existing mental illness treatment 
modalities" and that the "prognosis for rehabilitating sexually 
violent predators in the prison setting is poor."105 On the other 
hand, the state provided for commitment of sexually violent 
predators "for control, care and treatment" at a facility operated by 
the department of social and rehabilitation services.106 The 
Hendricks Court conceded that the treatment program the state 
offered Hendricks was "meager" but justified the virtually non-
existent level of care because the Kansas program was new .107 
At the time ofHendricks's commitment, Kansas had no funding or 
staff in place for the program; Hendricks himself remained in a 
mental health facility for ten months without the treatment 
prescribed by statute.108 The apparent inconsistencies in state-
ments by Kansas's legislature, 109 as well as the difficulties-or 
perhaps reluctance-of the state to implement its own legislative 
mandate, provide a useful starting point for considering whether 
treatment should be requisite to commitment as a matter of 
constitutional law and as a matter of sound policy. 
A. LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR THE TREATMENT REQUIREMENT 
The Supreme Court has never squarely held that mentally ill 
individuals have a constitutional right to treatment110 as a part 
103 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2077 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-29a01). 
104 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 ("The legislature finds that a small but extremely 
dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or 
defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the treatment 
act for mentally ill persons .... "). 
1os Id. 
106 Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a)). 
107 Id. at 2085. 
108 Id. at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
109 See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (describing legislature's inconsistent 
expressions); cf. Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 262-63 (describing Hendricks decision and 
noting that Justice Thomas, writing for majority, "detected a degree of ambiguity in the 
Kansas Supreme Court's resolution" regarding treatment requirement). 
110 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,317 (1982) ("As a general matter a state is under 
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border."); David 
W. Burgett, Substantive Due Process Limits on the Duration of Civil Commitment for the 
1998] KANSAS V. HENDRICKS 1277 
of involuntary commitment, but several cases suggest such a 
conclusion. m The Hendricks majority, in avoiding the issue of 
right to treatment, completely ignored some of these cases, failed 
to distinguish others, and relied on still others only for very general 
principles not specifically related to the right to treatment. 
First, the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana held that 
indefinite pretrial commitment of a deaf, mute criminal defendant 
was unconstitutional.112 In Jackson, the Court held that due 
process requires that the commitment bear some reasonable 
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.113 
Accordingly, Indiana rationalized Jackson's pretrial commitment as 
helping him attain competency to stand trial by providing care and 
treatment in a state facility.114 Jackson could never achieve 
fitness for trial, however, because no Indiana institution provided 
training or treatment that could improve his particular condi-
tion.115 Therefore, the Court held that continued detention of 
Jackson was not reasonably related to the purpose of his commit-
ment and hence, was unconstitutional.116 The Hendricks majority 
failed to discuss Jackson at all in deciding whether treatment was 
necessary to sustain the Kansas sex offender commitment statute. 
The only reference to Jackson by the Hendricks majority was in 
support of the proposition that the "mental illness" element of 
Treatment of Mental lllness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 205, 213 n.32 (clnrifying that "right 
to treatment" does not suggest affirmative right to state services, but rather condition on 
state's rights to confine its citizens). See generally Morton Birnbaum, The Right to 
Treatment, 46 AB.A. J. 499 (1960) (advocating right to treatment for individuals confined 
in public institutions). 
111 See generally Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1326 (citing cases that suggest existence or 
right to treatment). 
112 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972) (invalidating commitment on equal protection and due 
process grounds because state applied more lenient commitment standard and more 
stringent release standard to defendant than to civilly committed individuals not charged 
with criminal offenses). 
113 Id. at 738. 
114 Id. at 735. 
115 See id. at 728 (noting record established that no treatment or training was available 
at any state institution); see also THOMAS M'.AEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGINS AND 
EvOLUTION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 129-30 (1985) (describing testimony or two 
psychiatrists regarding Jackson's mental deficiency, inability to learn sign language, and dim 
prognosis, as well as other evidence in record establishing that state hospital could do 
nothing to improve his condition). 
116 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738-39. 
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commitment statutes can be described with a variety of expres-
sions.117 
The next Supreme Court decision to touch on the right to 
treatment was O'Connor v. Donaldson, 118 regarding the fifteen-
year custodial confinement of a man diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia.119 In ruling that proof of mental illness, without 
proof of dangerousness, was insufficient to sustain involuntary 
commitment, the Court declined to reach the question of Donald-
son's right to treatment.120 The lower court, however, specifically 
held that an involuntarily committed individual has "a constitution-
al right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a 
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental 
condition."121 The Supreme Court noted, but did not affirm, that 
portion of the lower court decision and remanded the case on a 
different question.122 Despite the equivocal stance on treatment 
expressed in the O'Connor opinion, many patients' rights advocates 
viewed the decision as a vindication of the right to treatment, and 
lower courts have continued to issue right to treatment decisions 
after O'Connor.123 Nevertheless, the only reference to O'Connor 
in the Hendricks majority's treatment discussion is a quote from 
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence regarding the power of a state 
to commit dangerous, mentally ill persons.124 
In addition, the Supreme Court in Allen v. Illinois125 discussed 
the right to treatment with respect to the Illinois Sexually Danger-
ous Persons Act. In deciding whether an alleged sexually danger-
ous person could claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
117 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1997) (noting that statute upheld in 
Jackson used terms "incompetency" and "insanity"). 
118 422 U.S. 563,564 (1975) (holding confinement ofnondangerous, mentally ill individual 
unconstitutional). 
119 Id. at 569 (describing evidence that Donaldson's confinement was regime of custodial 
care, not program designed to treat his illness). 
120 Id. at 573-74 & n.8; ROBERT D. MILLER, !NVOLUNTARY CML COMMITMENT OF THE 
MENTALLY ILL IN THE POST-REFORM ERA 104 (1987) (describing narrow holding in O'Connor). 
121 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), affd, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
122 O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 577 (remanding on question of immunity of state agent). 
123 MlLLER, supra note 120, at 105 (citing examples oflower court cases affirming right 
to treatment). 
124 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1997) (noting that power to commit is not 
defeated by fact that likelihood of recovery may be low). 
125 478 U.S. 364, 365 (1986). 
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incrimination, the Court had to decide whether the commitment 
scheme was civil or criminal in nature. The Illinois statute avowed 
an objective of "care and treatment" and disavowed any interest in 
punishment.126 Therefore, the court found that the statute was 
not punitive and held that the defendant could not invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.127 Justice Breyer, dissenting in Hendricks, 
relied on the "treatment" analysis in Allen, noting that because 
Kansas's objective was to treat rather than to punish seA'l.lally 
dangerous persons, the state.had a "statutory obligation to provide 
'care and treatment ... designed to effect recovery.' "128 
The Hendricks majority also relied on AI.Zen in its two alternative 
analyses of the treatment requirement. The Court first suggested 
that a state may commit an individual without providing any 
treatment.129 In drawing that conclusion, Justice Thomas cited 
.AUen,130 as well as United States v. Salerno,131 for the general 
proposition that incapacitation alone may be a legitimate state 
end.132 Justice Thomas, however, failed to mention distinguish-
ing facts of those two cases. In Allen, the Court said in dicta that 
a state has authority under its police power to protect the commu-
nity from danger.133 That case, however, did not rely on the 
police power justification since illinois clearly did provide treat-
ment and thus was acting under its parens patriae authority.134 
Furthermore, Justice Thomas did not mention that the Salerno 
holding was limited to the context of pretrial detention, a distinc-
tion relied on by the Foucha Court, in rejecting the broad right of 
states to commit on the basis of dangerousness alone.135 
126 Id. at 369-70. 
121 Id. at 375. 
128 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Allen); Lending Cases, 
supra note 17, at 264 (noting Breyer's reliance on Allen). 
129 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084. 
130 478 U.S. at 373. 
131 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987). 
132 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084. 
133 Allen, 478 U.S. at 373 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)). 
134 Id. (noting that Illinois's decision to supplement its parens pntriae concerns with 
measures to protect safety of other citizens did not render statute punitive). 
l3S See supra notes 33, 40 and accompanying text (describing holdings in Salerno and 
Foucha). 
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As an alternative to the conclusion that public safety alone could 
justify commitment, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court 
might conclude that treatment was the overriding purpose of the 
Kansas legislature and that the state did provide such treat-
ment.136 In that portion of the analysis, Justice Thomas again 
cited Allen for the rule that "the State has a statutory obligation to 
provide 'care and treatment.' "137 The majority concluded that 
Kansas met its obligation by providing "meager" treatment to 
Hendricks. 138 
In sum, courts attempting to apply Hendricks in subsequent 
cases are likely to be leery of the precedential value of the "treat-
ment" portion of the decision. First, it rests on independent, 
alternative grounds, and second, it was directed only at the double 
jeopardy and ex post facto challenges, which require the statute to 
be "non-punitive:" The Court crafted an opinion through cursory 
treatment of earlier cases and managed to avoid establishing a 
clear rule on the right to treatment of civilly committed sex 
offenders. 
In contrast, two leading lower court decisions, decided before 
Hendricks, have held that civilly committed individuals have a 
constitutional right to treatment. Not surprisingly, the Hendricks 
majority did not mention either case. First, in Rouse v. Camer-
on, 139 Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit Court, 
affirmed the right to treatment of an individual committed to a 
psychiatric facility as not guilty by reason of insanity. Second, the 
Fifth Circuit in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 140 after examining appalling 
conditions in state-operated mental health facilities in Ala-
bama, 141 held that ''the provision of treatment to those the state 
138 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084. 
137 Id. at 2085 (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 373, and Illinois statute regarding state purposo 
in treating sexually dangerous persons and describing treatment available in Kansas). 
1as Id. 
139 373 F.2d 451, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
140 503 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir. 1975), affg Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. 
Ala. 1971), implemented in 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972); see MILLER, supra note 120, at 104 
(describing Wyatt as establishing constitutional right to treatment). 
141 Wyatt, 503 F.2d at 1310 (describing conditions in hospital with 5000 inmates, patients 
with open wounds, urine and feces on the floor, malnourished patients, accidental deaths of 
patients due to inadequate supervision, and ratio of one master's level social worker for every 
2500 patients). 
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has involuntarily confined in mental hospitals is necessary to make 
the state's actions in confining and continuing to confine those 
individuals constitutional."142 Other circuit courts, as well as 
lower federal and state courts, have relied on Wyatt as establishing 
a constitutional right to treatment.143 
A recent district court case, also decided before Hendricks, 
discussed the constitutional right to treatment specifically in the 
context of sexually violent predators. The petitioner in Cameron v. 
Walsh144 was a fifty-three-year-old man, who was confined to a 
wheelchair, diabetic, blind and suffering from heart disease.145 
He was transferred to a state treatment center for sexually 
dangerous persons after six years of incarceration for various 
offenses, including assault with intent to commit rape.146 The 
court examined Cameron's right to treatment claim in the context 
of a double jeopardy challenge, which, like the Fifth Amendment 
challenge in AJ,len, 147 turned on finding that the commitment 
scheme was not punitive in purpose or effect.148 Cameron's 
double jeopardy claim was precluded by his previously filed civil 
rights suit, 149 but the court held that since the facility to which 
Cameron was committed actually provided some treatment, he 
could not suggest that the state had a punitive intent in keeping 
him there.150 
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to provide a clear rule on the 
right to treatment for mentally ill persons, the Court has issued a 
142 Id. at 1315. 
H 3 See, e.g., Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Courts hnve long reccgnized 
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit states to deprive 
mentally ill individuals of their freedom for therapeutic purposes unless some level of 
treatment is actually provided."); Id. at 100 (referring to Wyatt); Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 
F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Wyatt and noting thnt "[n)dequnte and effective 
treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, appellants could be held 
indefinitely as a result of their mental illness"). 
144 No. 95-10904-PBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11691, at •1 CD. Mass. July 23, 1996). 
HS Id. 
146 Id. at *3 (indicating that defendant pied guilty te kidnapping, lo.rceny of motor vehicle, 
assault with intent to commit rape, and threatening to commit crime). 
m Allen. u. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 380 (1986). 
Hs Cameron., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11691, at 0 19. 
H 9 Id. at *27 (describing petitioner's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. I 1998)). 
150 Id. Note the similar reasoning in Kansas u. Hendricks where tho Supreme Court 
suggested that if the Kansas commitment statute did require the state to provide treatment, 
"meager" treatment was sufficient. 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (1997). 
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definitive holding regarding the right to "habilitation"151 of men-
tally disabled persons. Mentally retarded individuals involuntarily 
committed to state institutions have a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in receiving minimally adequate training or 
habilitation.152 The Court stated this rule in the leading case of 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 153 based on the due process challenge of a 
profoundly retarded thirty-three-year-old man with the mental 
capacity of an eighteen-month-old child, who could not talk and was 
unable to perform basic self-care skills independently.154 Romeo 
conceded that no amount of training would enable him to live 
outside of an institution.155 Thus, the liberty interest he claimed 
was not the right to be released from confinement but the right to 
be free from physical restraints while in the hospital.156 The 
Court agreed that Romeo had a constitutional right to minimally 
adequate training in light of his liberty interests in safety and 
freedom from unreasonable restraints.157 
Circuit courts have interpreted Youngberg generally as requiring 
states to provide mentally retarded persons with habilitation 
according to prevailing practice standards.158 Some commenta-
151 
"Habilitation" refers to training and skills development for persons with mental 
retardation. Youngbergv. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,309 n.1 (1982). The term is distinguished 
from "treatment" because mentally retarded individuals are not viewed as "ill," but rather 
as learning disabled. Id. 
152 Id. at 322 (finding respondent entitled to minimally adequate training by balancing 
individual liberty interest against relevant state interests); id. at 324 (relying on Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), holding that conditions of confinement must comport with 
purpose of confinement). 
153 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
154 Id. at 309. 
155 Id. at 317. 
156 Id. The record documented several instances of injuries to Romeo from his own 
violence and from reactions of other patients to his aggression. Id. at 310. Hospital staff 
physically restrained or "shackled" Romeo routinely to prevent him from harming himself 
or others. Id. at 310-11 & n.4. Romeo asserted a right to training or habilitation to reduce 
his aggressive behavior and improve his self-care skills, which would accordingly reduce tho 
need for physical restraints. Id. at 318. 
157 Id. at 322; cf. Erlinder, supra note 3, at 134 (describing substantive due process test 
in Youngberg as balance of individual liberty interests against demands oforganized society). 
158 S.H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d 1045, 1046 (11th Cir. 1988); Society for Good Will to 
Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1246 (2d Cir. 1984); Phillips v. Thompson, 715 
F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983); see also In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1005 (Wash. 1993) (relying 
on Youngberg for proposition that involuntarily committed individuals are entitled to more 
treatment than persons confined for punishment). 
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tors suggest Youngberg stands for the right to treatment for all 
types of commitments.159 The Hendricks majority, however, failed 
even to mention, much less to distinguish, the Youngberg holding. 
In reviewing cases on the right to treatment, what is startling is 
not the suggestion that sexual perpetrators should receive treat-
ment for their disorders, but that the Supreme Court has managed 
to hedge on the question of the right to treatment for civilly 
committed sexual offenders. The Court's equivocation allows states 
to have their cake and eat it too; states can purport to confine 
sexual predators for "care and treatment" but can, without violating 
the Constitution, refuse to provide any treatment at all. This 
formulation appears particularly flawed after consideration of the 
prevailing state policy justifications for civil commitment of sexual 
offenders. 
B. STATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMMIT.MENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS 
Sexual predator commitment statutes usually are premised on 
state police powers and parens patriae powers.160 Police power 
authorizes the state to deprive one person's liberty for the welfare 
of society generally, but the power cannot be expanded to justify 
preventative detention without offending current Supreme Court 
precedent. Likewise, the parens patriae power justifies state action 
on behalf of vulnerable citizens; yet, states do not truly consider sex 
offenders vulnerable. Therefore, both of these theories of state 
power over individual liberty fail to provide constitutional justifica-
tion for civil commitment of sex offenders. 
1. Police Power. The Supreme Court has suggested that if a 
state justifies its sexual predator commitment act on police power, 
the state may not be required to provide any treatment at all.161 
159 Erlinder, supra note 3, at 134-35 (describing Youngberg as general test. for determining 
substantive due process rights of persons committed under "Psychopathic Personnlit.y 
statute[s]"); K Edward Greene, Mental Health Care for Children: Before and During State 
Custody, 13 CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 20 (1990) (noting that although majority in Youngberg did 
not address treatment rights of all persons in mental institutions, analysis is appropriate for 
evaluating rights of civilly committed mentally ill individuals). 
160 See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text (describing state policy justifications). 
161 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1996) (noting that incapacitation may be 
legitimate state end, relying on Allen v. fllinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986), and United States 
v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987)). 
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The state, under its police power, may incapacitate mentally ill 
individuals for the purpose of protecting society from dangerous 
tendencies of sexual predators.162 Under this view, a state's 
interest in protecting the public health and safety of the population 
as a whole justifies depriving a single individual's liberty.163 For 
example, states rely on police powers as the constitutional basis for 
quarantine laws. An individual with a contagious disease may be 
confined in order to protect society from infection-even if no 
treatment is available.164 Similarly, the state interest in public 
health also justifies invasion of an individual's right to privacy. For 
example, the state may compel individuals to undergo treatment for 
dangerous, contagious diseases.165 
In the context of commitment of sexually dangerous persons, 
some courts, including the Hendricks Court in its first of two 
"treatment" analyses, assert that police power alone may justify 
indefinite preventative detention.166 But a brief review of Su-
preme Court precedent on civil commitment belies such a sugges-
tion. The narrow context for pretrial detention of dangerous 
arrestees in Salerno,161 as well as the refusal of the Foucha 168 
162 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); see also State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 
133 (Wis. 1995) (stating that "the state has a compelling interest in protecting tho public 
from dangerous mentally disordered persons"). 
163 Janus, supra note 52, at 167. 
164 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (noting that persons are subject to 
burdens, such as vaccination, in order to secure general comfort, health and prosperity of 
state); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 
380, 388 (1902) (cited by majority in Hendricks for proposition that state can civilly dotain 
such persons even in the absence of treatment); see State v. Fulton, 166 N.W.2d 874, 885 
(Iowa 1969) (comparing procedure and purpose of sex offender commitment to quarantino for 
contagious and infectious diseases). 
165 See McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding stato intorost 
in preventing spread of tuberculosis in prison population justified compelled medical 
treatment of inmate); Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1382 (10th Cir. 1973) 
(upholding city ordinance allowing involuntary detention and treatment of persons suspected 
of having venereal diseases). 
166 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1997); see, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 
422 U.S. 563, 583-84 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (suggesting that state can exorciso polico 
power to "protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or communicablo 
disease"); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940); Bniloy v. 
Gardenbring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 
(Minn. 1994). 
167 United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987). 
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Court to uphold commitment without a showing of mental illness 
cut against suggestions that states may involuntarily commit 
individuals under police powers on the basis of dangerousness 
alone. 169 To conclude otherwise is contrary to one of the most 
fundamental notions of our criminal justice system. Individuals 
may be confined as punishment because they commit affirmative 
acts, not merely because they have dangerous inclinations.170 
Therefore, the potential danger that sex offenders present to society 
is insufficient to justify indefinite commitment after their punitive 
detention term ends. Accordingly, most states recognize that the 
mental illness element in sexual predator laws, and not just the 
element of dangerousness, is essential to the commitment 
schemes.171 Nevertheless, "pathologizing" sexual offenders and 
"medicalizing" the problem of sexual violence is an inappropriate 
solution to this social problem.172 
2. Parens Patriae. As the police power justification is insuffi-
cient to sustain sexual perpetrator commitment schemes, states 
turn to their parens patriae authority. Parens patriae is the power 
of the state to act on behalf of juveniles or other individuals who 
168 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85 (1992) (denying power of state to detain 
dangerous individual indefinitely without medical justification). 
169 Erlinder, supra note 3, at 152-53 (rejecting suggestion that predicted dangerousness 
alone justifies detention); Janus, supra note 52, at 163 (describing "jurisprudenco of 
prevention" which balances state interest in safety against individual interest in liberty, 
ignoring mental disorder element in civil commitment). 
170 Statev. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 136 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("Although 
the end result may seem attractive, under our constitutions the state cannot simply lock 
people up on the supposition that they will be dangerous in the future when they have 
already served their sentences for crimes committed in the pll.St. n). "[N)o temporal tribunal 
can search the heart, or fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than as they are 
demonstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for whnt it cannot know." 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 180 (Sanford H. Kadish & 
Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 1995) (citing William Blackstone). 
171 See Dan W. Brock, Involuntary Commitment: The Moral Issues, in l',Ifil.."TAL ILL."lESS: 
LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY 147, 154 (Baruch A. Brody & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. eds. 1980) 
[hereinafter LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY] (distinguishing civil commitment from incm-cerotion 
on basis that civil commitment lacks condemnation or assignment of guilt). 
172 See Morse, supra note 3, at 129 ("We cannot justly solve our socinl problems by 
'medicalizing' them and then granting the state otherwise unjustified powers to control the 
lives of citizens."); see also infra Section V .A. (discussing medicnl model in relation to 
commitment of sexual predators). 
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are unable to care for themselves.173 A state may deprive an 
individual's liberty not because of the threat to others in society but 
because of the risk that the individual will harm himself. For 
example, a state may limit the liberty of a child or incompetent 
individual in order to protect that vulnerable person from 
harm.174 The parens patriae power turns on an individual's 
"incompetence," therefore labelling sex offenders "mentally ill" is 
crucial to invoke this power. 
Nevertheless, states still have to rely on broad assumptions about 
mental illness and sexual deviance to rely on their parens patriae 
authority. Individual liberty is predicated on the belief that people 
are capable of rational thought.175 Mentally ill people, by con-
trast, are deemed incapable of rational thought. Accordingly, they 
are not legally responsible for their acts176 and the state may 
restrict their individual liberties.177 It is at this point that the 
logic behind the parens patriae justification for civil commitment 
of sexual offenders breaks down-states do not and cannot show 
173 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) ("The state has a legitimate interest 
under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of 
emotional disorders to care for themselves."); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 
1988) (noting that because parens patriae is premised on state caring for those who cannot 
care for themselves, power is implicated only when individual cannot make own evaluation 
of need for treatment); Bassiouni, supra note 81, at 299-300 (describing parens patriao power 
of state to protect individual from harming himself and accompanying duty to confine such 
individual for care and treatment); Janus, supra note 52, at 171 (asserting that parons 
patriae power depends on existence of mental illness for its internal logic). 
174 Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation About the Due Process Rights 
of Children, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 407, 414 (1996) (noting that parens patriao power 
emerged from perceived need to protect vulnerable children and power justified state action 
contrary to liberty interest of children); Rolf E. Sartorius, Paternalistic Grounds for 
Involuntary Civil Commitment: A Utilitarian Perspective, in LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra 
note 171, at 137, 139 (noting that if individual has condition which renders him dangerous 
to himself as well as incapable of rational decision to act in less dangerous way, state may 
legitimately interfere with his liberty to prevent him from harming himselO. 
175 Bassiouni, supra note 81, at 298 (noting power of state to restrain persons incapable 
ofrespecting public order); Teir & Coy, supra note 3, at 414 (suggesting that society allows 
independent choice and conduct so long as under rational control). 
176 Bassiouni, supra note 81, at 298 (describing state's parens patriae power over people 
who are unable to respect public order due to their "legal irresponsibility"). 
177 Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1332 (noting that "involuntary commitment is appropriate 
only for those incompetent to make rational decisions about their care or treatment"); Toir 
& Coy, supra note 3, at 414 ("The mentally ill ... enjoy a diminished amount of individual 
liberty because they are incapable of making the rational choices that are necessary to 
participate as full members of society."). 
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that sexual offenders as a class, are incapable of rational 
thought.178 Moreover, the fact that one of the elements of civil 
commitment of sexual offenders is a prior criminal act179 suggests 
that states certainly do not consider these individuals "legally 
irresponsible"180 since the state, in prosecuting offenders, already 
held them responsible for their acts. 
V. DOES PARENS PATRIAE JUSTIFY STATE ACTION? 
In order to commit sexual offenders involuntarily under its 
parens patriae powers, a state must first demonstrate that the 
individual is "incompetent" or "sick. "181 Second, the purpose of 
the commitment must bear some reasonable relation to the confine-
ment; that is, the state must show its purpose is "care and 
treatment."182 The problem with the parens patriae justification 
is that sex offenders may not be "sick" or "incompetent" and, 
moreover, they may not be treatable. 
A. ARE SEXUAL OFFENDERS "SICK" OR "INCO:MPETENT"? 
The power of a state to infringe individual liberty under its 
parens patriae power turns not on what the individual "did," but on 
what the individual "is. "183 This distinction relates to the ques-
tion under Foucha184 regarding the "mental illness" or "mental 
178 See Teir & Coy, supra note 3, at 425 (stating without reservation that sex offenders 
can recognize difference between right and wrong). 
179 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing elements of sexually violent 
predator commitment schemes including past conduct). 
180 Morse, supra note 3, at 135 ("Nonresponsibility is usually a necessary condition of 
justifiable involuntary civil commitment • • • but proponents of newer [sex offender 
commitment] laws provide no coherent theory to suggest that sexual offenders as a class are 
not responsible."). 
181 See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (describing basis of power). 
182 Brock, supra note 171, at 171 ("Where involuntary commitment is on paternalistic 
grounds of incompetence, mental illness and treatability, the involuntary hospitalization and 
provision of treatment is for the person's own good."). 
183 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (describing parens patriae and goal of juvenile 
justice system as determining what a child "is" and how he became what he is, rather than 
determining guilt or innocence); Morse, supra note 3, at 121 (noting that sex offender 
commitments are more harmful to individual dignity because they label or classify offenders, 
rather than punish acts of free will). 
164 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). 
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abnormality" requirement for sex offender commitment.185 But 
even if Foucha can be read to afford states broad discretion to 
define "mental illness" in their sex offender statutes, 186 those 
definitions may still be insufficient to justify state deprivation of 
liberty under parens patriae. The parens patriae power turns on 
finding the individual incapacitated or incompetent and thus in 
need of protection by the state.187 
In its substantive due process discussion, the Hendricks Court 
suggested that lack of competency and responsibility were impor-
tant elements of states' statutory definitions of "mental illness" or 
"mental abnormality."188 Consider, however, the definition of 
mental abnormality in the statute under which Kansas committed 
Leroy Hendricks: " 'Mental abnormality' means a congenital or 
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity 
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in 
a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and 
safety of others."189 This definition emphasizes the "menace to 
... others" presented by sexual offenders which involves the police 
power, but the definition says nothing to suggest incapacity or need 
for protection of the committed individual himself, consistent with 
the state's parens patriae power. The definition does suggest that 
sexual offenders suffer from a "volitional" impairment, 190 which 
renders them "incapable" of resisting certain actions. The defini-
tion does not suggest that such "volitional" impairment causes 
sexually dangerous persons to endanger themselves, but rather that 
the impairment predisposes them to hurt others. Thus, the 
185 See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text (discussing confusion over definition of 
mental illness element of commitment). 
186 See supra notes 43, 48 (noting deference to state legislative determinations). 
187 Bruce J. Winick,Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL 'Y & L. 534, 587 (1995) (noting that parens patriae power is promised 
on presumed incapacity of minors and of mentally disabled persons to protect or care for 
themselves). 
186 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (1996) (distinguishing legal definitions 
from medical definitions by noting that legal definitions must "take into account such issues 
as individual responsibility ... and competency") (citing DSM-IV, supra note 47, at xxiii, 
xxvii). 
169 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994). 
190 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 (noting Hendricks's lack of volitional control which, along 
with dangerousness, suggests that sexual offenders should not be dealt with exclusively in 
the criminal justice system). 
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definition fails to describe a person in need of state care and 
protection. 
The Kansas statute also provides for commitment of individuals 
with personality disorders.191 The term "personality disorder" is 
a recognized medical diagnostic category192 and may be a suffi-
cient predicate for commitment under Foucha. 193 Nevertheless, 
that diagnostic category in no way suggests that the individual is 
"incompetent" or in need of protection from self-harm. Thus, the 
condition cannot trigger a state's parens patriae authority to 
deprive an individual of his liberty.194 
B. DO STATES REALLY AIM TO "TREAT" SEXUAL OFFENDERS? 
Civil commitment statutes for sex offenders are not enacted by 
legislatures out of compassion for persons they deem "sexually 
dangerous."195 Given society's disdain for sexual deviants196 
and the fact that many sex offender commitment statutes are 
191 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01, 59-29a02(a) (allowing commitment of persons convicted 
of or charged with sexually violent offense who suffer from a "mental abnormality" or 
"personality disorder"). 
192 DSM-IV, supra note 47, at 629-73 (describing first diagnostic criterion of personality 
disorder: "[a]n enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly 
from the expectations of the individual's culture"). 
193 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 87-88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring); In re 
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994) ("We do not read Foucha to prohibit Minnesota's 
commitment program for psychopathic personalities."); see supra note 47 (discussing 
antisocial personality disorder). But see Morse, supra note 3, at 126 (noting that person 
diagnosed with "antisocial personality disorder" is unlikely to be involuntarily committed 
under general civil commitment standard because he seems too rational to qualify as 
nonresponsible). 
194 S~opp, supra note 72, at 187 (noting that statutory definition of sex offenders does 
not suggest impairment of processes that would undermine individual's status as competent 
practical reasoner); Wmick, supra note 187, at 587 (noting that assumption that mental 
illness substantially impairs decision-making capacity is not true for many conditions). 
195 In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996) (noting that legislature's "overriding 
concern" was detention of sexual offenders and treatment with goal of reintegration was 
"incidental, at best"), rerld sub nom. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); State v. 
Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 139 (WIS. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("lT]o suggest that [the 
commitment] law is merely a benign exercise of the State's parens patriae authority ••• is 
to ignore the reality of the political context in which this law was passed and the manner in 
which it was drafted." (quoting Wisconsin circuit court in Stale v. Carpenter, No. 94-CF-1216 
(Dane County July 22, 1994))). 
196 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing society's views of sex 
offenders). 
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enacted in response to public outrage, 197 such a suggestion seems 
almost laughable. The political reality runs contrary to the parens 
patriae justification for commitment. The premise of parens 
patriae is that the state incapacitates an individual in order to 
treat and rehabilitate him so that he can reenter society as a full 
and productive member.198 States do not, however, appear to 
enact sex offender commitment laws out of an interest in returning 
"recovered" sexual predators to the community. In fact, these 
statutes seem to be enacted for the very purpose of preventing such 
reintegration. 
The juvenile justice system provides a useful comparison for 
considering states' actual motivations with respect to treatment 
and rehabilitation of persons detained under parens patriae. States 
originally limited their parens patriae power to care and custody of 
vulnerable children. More recently, states have extended the reach 
of the parens patriae power to authorize commitment of "ill" or 
"incompetent" adults. The current trend in juvenile justice, 
however, has been away from the idea of protecting wayward 
children and towards placing individual responsibility on juveniles 
for their antisocial acts. States increasingly reject the appropriate-
ness of parens patriae authority over disruptive juveniles, 199 yet 
they invoke that same authority to "care for" the disfavored class 
of sexual offenders. These policy approaches are inconsistent and 
the stark contrast between them betrays the true legislative intent 
behind sex offender commitment laws. 
At its inception, the juvenile justice system relied on the parens 
patriae theory, with the objective of providing treatment and 
rehabilitation to help delinquent children become productive 
197 See, e.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989,992 (Wash. 1993) (describing political context for 
passage of Washington Community Protection Act). 
198 E.g., Hill v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Mass. 1996) (emphasizing that 
commitment of sexually dangerous persons is intended to provide individual with 
opportunity to overcome his uncontrollable sexual urges so that he can successfully reenter 
society); Bassiouni, supra note 81, at 300 (noting parens patriae objective of restoring 
individual to useful role in society). 
199 See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting suggestion 
that parens patriae authority requires states to provide treatment as a part of incarceration 
of juvenile delinquents). 
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citizens.200 Early twentieth-century reformers advocated a juve-
nile justice system to provide treatment and rehabilitation of 
"delinquents" rather than punishment and incarceration in the 
adult penal system. AB a part of the reformed approach, states 
relaxed the formality and procedural rules of adult adjudica-
tion.201 Juveniles traded the procedural protection of the adult 
courts for the rehabilitative benefits of the juvenile system. 202 
Nevertheless, the reality of the juvenile system was that juveniles 
got the "worst of both worlds"203 because states failed to provide 
care and treatment to their delinquent charges. 
In response to such criticism, courts have expanded procedural 
protections for juveniles, 204 but states have not yet improved 
treatment in juvenile detention facilities.205 Increasingly, delin-
quent children are held legally responsible for their actions. 206 
They are no longer presumed incapable of rationally exercising free 
will and thus in need of protection and care.207 In light of the 
demise of informal juvenile proceedings, as well as changing 
200 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967)(noting belief of early juvenile justice reformers that 
role of society was to determine "what had best be done in (the child's) interest and in the 
interest of the state to save him from a downward career"). 
201 CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 742-45 (Samuel 1L Davis, et nl. eds. 1997) (describing 
origins and philosophy of juvenile justice system). 
202 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (noting that juvenile system 
denies certain due process safeguards, which is constitutionally acceptable since purpose of 
incarceration is rehabilitation, not punishment); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (providing that effective treatment is the quid pro quo of society's right to 
exercise its parens patriae power). But cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585-87 
(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (rejecting quid pro quo theory of state's obligation to pro\ide 
treatment in exchange for deprivation of liberty); Greene, supra note 159, at 33 (noting 
Burger's rejection of quid pro quo theory). 
203 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (asserting that juveniles got neither 
procedural protections of adult courts nor "solicitous care nnd regenerative treatment• 
intended for children). 
204 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-20 (expanding procedural protections including notice of 
charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination as well as prhilege 
against self-incrimination for children in delinquency hearings). 
205 Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 14, at 1791 (noting juvenile institutions "have 
historically been understaffed, unhealthy, and devoid of rehabilitative programming"). 
206 Espenoza, supra note 174, at 416 (noting that juveniles are now held strictly 
accountable for their crimes in contrast to older view that they were mornlly incapable of 
committing crimes). 
= Cf. Holland & 1flyniec, supra note 14, at 1795 (noting that early juvenile court 
statutes rejected notion of free will and sought origin of juvenile delinquency elsewhere). 
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notions of juvenile responsibility for bad behavior, states have little 
legal incentive to provide treatment and rehabilitation to juvenile 
offenders. 208 
The inappropriateness of the parens patriae power as a justifica-
tion for commitment of sexually violent predators is evident when 
compared to states' approaches to juveniles under the same theory. 
First, sexual predator statutes were not sparked by public sympa-
thy whereas compassion was the impetus for early juvenile 
reform.209 Second, sex offenders were never promised treatment 
and rehabilitation in exchange for relaxed legal process, the 
premise of reform in juvenile courts. In fact, sex offender statutes 
typically contain a range of procedural protections.21° Finally, 
states have never suggested that sex offenders lack free will or are 
legally irresponsible which was the perception of juvenile offenders. 
In fact, most sex offender laws require as an element of commit-
ment that the individual have been previously charged with or 
convicted of a sexual offense.211 Given these distinctions, the 
inappropriateness of parens patriae power in the context of sexual 
predators becomes evident. The origins and assumptions underly-
ing states' power to deprive the liberty of juveniles for their own 
protection do not apply to sex offender detentions. States invoke 
their parens patriae power to justify commitment but lack a sincere 
interest in the "treatment and care" of sexually violent predators. 
C. ARE SEXUAL OFFENDERS "TREATABLE"? 
The Hendricks Court left unanswered the question of whether 
sexual offenders are treatable.212 Indeed, the majority did not 
208 Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting class action claim 
of right to treatment in juvenile detention camp in Puerto Rico, in part, on state's power to 
confine juveniles solely to protect society); Holland & Mlyniec, supra note 14, at 1794 (tracing 
decline of right to treatment injuvenilejustice after recent judicial decisions). But cf. JOHN 
P. WILSON, THE RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 247 (1978) 
(concluding that juveniles' right to treatment was gaining recognition by courts and 
legislatures in previous era). 
209 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26 (noting themes of compassion, goodwill, benevolence, and 
paternalism in early conceptions of juvenile court). 
210 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text (describing various procedural due 
process protections in sexual predator acts). 
211 See supra note 52 (outlining elements of sexual offender commitment statutes), 
212 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (1997) (rejecting Hendricks's assertion that 
he was denied available treatment but not definitively concluding that Kansas considered 
Hendricks untreatable). 
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consider determination of that crucial question essential to its 
holding, which was based on alternative grounds.213 Justice 
Breyer, in bis dissent, suggested that Kansas did concede that 
treatment was available for Hendricks's condition; thus, the dissent 
framed the issue instead as whether the state had to provide the 
treatment it conceded was available.214 
The Hendricks Court's awkward response to the "treatability" of 
sexual offenders reflects the lively dispute on that point among 
scholars.215 Resolution of the question, however, is crucial to the 
parens patriae justification for commitment.216 If a state deprives 
an individual's liberty because he is unwell and dangerous yet fails 
to provide any treatment for that condition, the commitment 
becomes a life sentence.217 "Treatment" is the "key" that unlocks 
the hospital door.218 
How, then, does a state "treat" a legislatively created condi-
tion?219 Most sex offender commitment statutes define "se::i-.."Ually 
dangerous persons" very generally, and thus the definitions do not 
213 Id. (rejecting Hendricks's ex post facto and double jeopardy claims on basis that either 
incapacitation alone may be legitimate non-punitive state end or that Hendricks did receive 
treatment for his condition and thus his commitment was not punitive in purpose or effect). 
214 Id. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting} (citing Kansas attorney general's response during 
trial that Hendricks was treatable and suggesting that no one argued to tho contrary). 
215 RoNALD M. HOLMES, THE SEX OFFENDER AND THE CRThllNAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 168 
(1983) (describing various therapeutic approaches to sex offenders); SANDRA L. INGERSOLL 
& SUSAN 0. PATI'ON, TREATING PERPETRATORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 79 (1990) (noting lack of 
research on treatment of perpetrators); ADELE :MAYER, SEX OFFENDERS: APPROACHES TO 
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT 62 (1988) (arguing that mental health professionals 
appear to be advocating therapy in absence of proven methodologies); Monahan & Davis, 
supra note 2, at 199 (describing study which noted that "none of these data prove that any 
particular treatment is effective in helping to rehabilitate sex offenders"). 
216 MAYER, supra note 215, at 82 {"The mistaken assumption of 'trea.tability' has been 
based largely on a needed rationale to justify implementation of therapeutic programs."). 
217 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 923 {Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting) 
{questioning how Blodgett can show he is no longer in need of treatment when "the very 
p5Ycb.iatrists who are charged with treating him say there is no treatment for an antisocial 
personality disorder"). 
218 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994) (providing for release on showing that "person 
is safe to be at large and will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged"); MINN. 
STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 15 (1992) (providing that sexual predator mny be confined indefinitely 
until he shows to satisfaction of commission and special review board that he is no longer 
dangerous and no longer in need of treatment). 
219 Erlinder, supra note 3, at 133 ("Hospitalization and medical treatment cannot cure n 
legislatively created category."). 
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accurately reflect the myriad diagnoses that may describe people 
who commit sex crimes.220 Nevertheless, states typically recom-
mend similar treatment for the entire category of offenders.221 
The over-generalization in diagnosis and treatment interventions 
for sex offenders may, in part, explain the lack of success in 
"curing" sexual offenders. 222 In fact, there is no reason to believe 
that sex offenders are any more "treatable" than other criminals 
generally.223 States must assume that sexual predators are 
treatable in order to justify indefinite commitment; states purport 
to rehabilitate rather than just detain. Until it is clear that 
treatment could actually help these offenders overcome their sexual 
tendencies, however, states cannot single them out as a class for 
preventative detention. 
VI. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES 
The preceding sections or"this Note described the legal precedent 
for a constitutional right to treatment224 and suggested that the 
Court in Hendricks225 failed adequately to address that prece-
220 See, e.g., Monahan & Davis, supra note 2, at 196 (describing diagnoses given to sex 
offenders evaluated for California program, including "sexual deviation," "personality 
disorders," "pedophilia," and "psychosis"). 
221 MAYER, supra note 215, at 79. See generally Carl Warren Gilmore, Treating Sex 
Offenders, WIS. LAW. Oct. 1994 at 20, 21-23 (describing assessment procedures and standard 
programming established by Wisconsin Department of Corrections to serve some 600 sex 
offenders annually). 
222 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 918 n.1 & 925 n.15 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (noting limited 
success of treatment of committed offenders in Minnesota facilities and citing William D. 
Erickson, The Psychopathic Personality Statute, Need for Change 3, 19 (1991) (unpublished 
paper presented by the Commissioner of Human Services to the Minnesota Legislature)). 
Dr. Erickson reported that of 21 men committed under the sex offender statute, only one was 
making reasonable progress in treatment, none were mentally ill, and none were taldng 
psychotropic medications. Id. at n.15. Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1329 (conceding reports 
of poor outcome in treatment programs for sex offenders by medical community but urging 
flexibility so that clinicians might modify treatment to make it more effective); Hammel, 
supra note 43, at 810 (noting that studies report disappointing results in treatment for sex 
offenders, particularly for target population of sexual predator laws). 
223 MAYER, supra note 215, at 82-85 (noting that sex offenders share many characteristics 
with other criminals and hypothesizing about therapeutic approach); Morse, supra note 3, 
at 140 (rejecting justification for preventive detention on basis that sexual predators arc 
"specially treatable"). 
224 See supra Part IV.A. 
225 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997). 
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dent.226 In addition, this Note scrutinized the police power and 
parens patriae power justifications for civil commitment of sex 
offenders, finding these justifications inadequate to sustain the 
massive liberty infringement. 227 
The issue of sexual violence is serious and compelling for the 
public and for state officials.228 Nevertheless, civil commitment 
of sexual predators in absence of treatment is an appropriate 
response to that concern. Thus, states should closely examine their 
true purpose in confining sexually dangerous persons. If the true 
state concern is safety and protection of the public, state legislators 
can increase the underlying sentence for sex crimes.229 That ap-
proach seems most closely aligned with states' actual objective in 
drafting sexual predator statutes-removing a disfavored class of 
criminals from the streets. Increased sentencing also has the 
benefit of presenting few administrative complexities,230 aside 
from the pre-existing problems of overcrowding and limited 
resources for penal facilities. Such a solution, furthermore, would 
not present the potential constitutional deficiencies characteristic 
of civil commitment.231 
226 See Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 268-69 (concluding thnt Hendricr.s Court failed 
to define parameters of civil commitment clearly and thus gnve states broad authority to 
commit sex offenders indefinitely). 
227 See supra Part IV.B. 
228 Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1336 (describing sexual predation as "particularly noxious 
and fearsome public problem"); Erlinder, supra note 3, at 158 (noting that government "must 
find a way to respond to the legitimate public concern" over sexual violence); Tier & Coy, 
supra note 3, at 426 (asserting that sexual predators are a "serious, recurrent, and difficult. 
problem facing our society"). 
229 Tier & Coy, supra note 3, at 426 (noting that "longer jail terms [for sex offenders) mny 
be warranted in some circumstances"); Marna J. Johnson, Comment, Minnesota's Sexual 
Psyclwpathi.c Personality and Sexually Dangerous Person Statute: Throwing Away the Key, 
21 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1139, 1187 (1996) (suggesting that longer sentences are one way 
to deter sexual violence). 
230 Cf. infra notes 232-238 and accompanying text (describing various issues facing states 
implementing treatment programs). 
231 See Erlinder, supra note 3, at 158 (advocating longer sentences rather than civil 
commitment and noting that even if legislature mandates life sentence for re-offenders, 
"society would be well-protected without creating the threat to personnl liberty posed by 
[commitment statutes]"). But cf. Cornwell, supra note 41, at 1336 (suggesting thnt enhanced 
prison sentences are "virtually unimpeachable constitutionally" and expressing concern that 
states will define "appropriate punishment" based on fear of recidivism rather than on 
proportional blame). 
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On the other hand, if the state's true concern is rehabilitation, 
that purpose should be clearly stated in the legislative act, and the 
state must actually provide care and treatment aimed at improving 
the condition of these "sick" persons so that they can return to the 
community as productive members. States face many difficulties 
implementing treatment programs for sex offenders. First, states 
may lack adequate resources to establish treatment programs.232 
Lack of funding, however, does not justify a state's failure to 
comply with its constitutional mandate of providing treatment 
when such treatment is the justification for infringing on individual 
rights. 233 Second, states will actually have to resolve the issue of 
whether sex offenders are treatable.234 In considering that 
question, states may need to move away from a general, all-
inclusive statutory definition of"mental abnormality" to describe all 
sexual predators and towards more particularized definitions of the 
various conditions from which these individuals suffer. Such 
clarification is necessary to facilitate appropriate and effective 
treatment, rather than relying on the assumption that all sex 
offenders will benefit from the same therapeutic interventions.235 
States will also need to identify those individuals whose deviant 
behavior stems not from illness, but from the exercise of free will 
and who thus should be punished rather than treated. Consider-
able resources will need to be invested to allow individualized 
assessments of treatment needs and culp~bility.236 
Furthermore, states may have to consider specific treatment 
issues such as the efficacy of "compelled" treatment for persons 
with sexual disorders. Certain treatment strategies may be 
= Burgett, supra note 110, at 258-59 (describing potential drain on state mental health 
resources from civil commitment process); Hammel, supra note 43, at 811-12 (noting that 
treatment programs "will have to be comprehensive and quite expensive to be effective" and 
suggesting that California program failed to treat all eligible offenders due to lack offunds). 
But cf. INGERSOLL & PATI'ON, supra note 215, at 92-94 (suggesting that sex offender 
treatment programs might not incur overwhelming costs). 
233 Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1315 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that inadequate 
resources cannot justify state's deprivation of individual's constitutional rights). 
234 See supra Section V.c. (discussing treatability of sex offenders). 
235 INGERSOLL & PATI'ON, supra note 215, at 22 (describing different treatment approaches 
for various types of offenders). 
236 Tier & Coy, supra note 3, at 426 (distinguishing sex offenders who are appropriately 
handled through increased jail sentences from those who truly suffer from mental 
abnormality and thus should receive treatment). 
1998] KANSAS V. HENDRICKS 1297 
ineffective for offenders who do not undergo treatment voluntari-
ly.237 Moreover, if states commit sex offenders at the end of their 
penal sentences rather than providing treatment during incarcera-
tion, they will need to consider the implications of delaying 
treatment. After several years of imprisonment, offenders may 
have less insight into their actions and incarceration itself may 
exacerbate their pathologies.238 Therefore, states might consider 
providing treatment well before offenders' penal sentences e:i-..-pire. 
This Note calls for states to approach the serious problem of 
sexual violence through principled and honest laws. By contorting 
the legitimate state power of civil commitment over dangerous, 
mentally ill individuals to encompass sexually violent predators, 
states undermine their authority. States increase the social stigma 
and perception of dangerousness on all mentally ill persons by 
lumping the "obnoxious"239 class of sex offenders together with 
other persons suffering from serious, chronic mental illnesses. As 
a corollary, civil commitment of sex offenders in lieu of longer 
punitive detention undermines the legitimacy of states' criminal 
justice systems. By committing rather than jailing, states suggest 
that sex offenders are less responsible and less blameworthy for 
their wrongs than other criminals. If the state views sex offenders 
as "sick" it should help them; if the state views them as "bad" it 
should jail them. What a state constitutionally cannot do is 
indefinitely imprison persons it has labelled mentally ill. States 
should not sacrifice the integrity of their separate systems for care 
and protection of mentally ill people, on the one hand, and for 
social control of criminals, on the other hand, in order to respond 
to public pressures regarding sexual violence.2''0 
237 Gilmore, supra note 221, at 56 (describing range of attitude of inmaws towards 
treatment); see HOLMES, supra note 215, at 168 (describing treatment approach which 
requires admission of guilt as "the first step towards rehabilitation"). 
238 lNGERSOLL & PATI'ON, supra note 215, at 99-100 (quoting treatment specialist who 
suggested that sex offenders come out of prison with worse fantasies, more violence, and 
more anger than before incarceration). 
239 Erlinder, supra note 3, at 158 (noting James Madison's theory that society will use its 
power to disadvantage of "most obnoxious" persons and suggesting that "sexual predators 
are certainly a minority most of society justifiably finds 'obnoxious' "}. 
240 Janus, supra note 52, at 212-13 (describing principle of"criminnl interstitinlity" which 
draws constitutional line between punishment and civil commitment); Morse, supra note 3, 
at 154 (asserting that "legitimacy of both criminal and civil confinement systems depends 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
[Vol. 32:1261 
Society disapproves of individuals who violate its behavioral 
norms. That notion is the basis of punishment in the criminal 
justice system. Among violators of society's laws, we are particular-
ly disdainful of persons who commit violent acts of sexual deviance. 
Those acts offend both our behavioral standards and our moral 
standards. The acts injure us in personal and intimate ways. 
Accordingly, states have singled out sexual offenders for special 
treatment. 
Many states have enacted special sexual predator laws that 
borrow from general civil commitment statutes authorizing 
detention of mentally ill and dangerous persons. The purpose of 
civil commitment is to provide care and treatment to mentally ill 
persons so they can return to society. Civil commitment is 
appropriate for mentally ill people because their conditions posed 
risks to the public and to themselves. Civil, as opposed to criminal, 
detention is constitutionally justified because mentally ill people 
are vulnerable or incompetent and thus in need of state protection. 
In contrast, sexual predators are not considered vulnerable or 
incompetent but rather extremely dangerous and blameworthy. 
Thus, the use of civil c;ommitment in the context of sexual preda-
tors is an inappropriate response to a serious social problem. 
Nevertheless, states have seized the power of civil commitment 
to authorize indefinite preventative detention of a particularly 
disfavored class of criminals. To commit sexual deviants under 
civil commitment statutes, states have had to stretch the definition 
of "mental illness" to fit a diverse class of criminals whose deviant 
tendencies stem from a wide range of biological and developmental 
origins.241 States cannot, however, show that sex offenders, as a 
class, are any more "sick" than other criminals who have violated 
societal norms of behavior. Thus, the special commitment laws are 
unjustified. 
on maintaining the distinction between them"); Schopp, supra note 72, at 192 (concluding 
that sex offender commitment laws "undermine moral force of both mental health and 
criminal law"). 
241 Leading Cases, supra note 17, at 268-69 (concluding that Hendricks gives states 
authority to "lock up indefinitely anyone who is found to fall into the nearly boundless 
category of mentally abnormal-from the most profoundly insane to those who fall through 
the cracks of the criminal justice system"). 
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Civil commitment is a massive infringement of individual liberty. 
In order to justify such infringement as a matter of due process, 
states must show a reasonable relation between a compelling state 
interest and the purpose of the commitment. The two sources of 
state power invoked to authorize civil commitment are police power 
and parens patriae power. Both of these powers, however, fail to 
justify civil commitment of sex offenders. Police power allows 
-states to detain dangerous people who pose a risk to society. The 
Supreme Court, however, has limited that power to very specific 
situations which do not encompass sexual predator laws. 
Parens patriae power allows states to detain vulnerable persons 
who pose a risk to themselves. This state power, however, fails to 
justify civil commitment of sexual predators for several reasons. 
First, states do not really consider sex offenders to be vulnerable. 
Second, even if states do consider sex offenders to be "ill," they do 
not seek to rehabilitate them and return them to society. Finally, 
even if states had such a goal they cannot show that treatment is 
effective in "curing" sexual predators. Accordingly, states detain 
sex offenders under the pretense of providing care and treatment 
put in reality the individuals stand little or no chance of release. 
The United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks 
recently upheld a Kansas statute which allows the state to detain 
certain convicted sex offenders indefinitely in mental health 
treatment facilities. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in the long 
line of precedential cases preceding Hendricks has equivocated on 
the right to treatment of persons detained under all types of civil 
commitment laws. The Hendricks court perpetuated that ambigu-
ity by failing to hold that Kansas must provide treatment in 
conjunction with civil detention of sexually dangerous persons. The 
Court, therefore, has left a loophole through which states can keep 
prior sex offenders off the streets indefinitely. A legislative 
statement that commitment is intended for "care and treatment" 
may be enough to rebut a due process challenge even if no treat-
ment ig actually provided. 
This Note concludes, however, that such a result is unprincipled 
and violates the premises of both criminal detention and civil 
commitment. In light of the shortcomings of current justifications 
for committing sexual offenders, states should address the serious 
problem of sexual violence and public demands for safety through 
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one of two distinct approaches. States which act primarily out of 
concern for protecting society from dangerous sexual predators 
should employ their pre-existing criminal justice systems to punish 
and incarcerate those criminals. States which act out of concern for 
the "ll" or deviant offender himself should treat and rehabilitate 
that incompetent individual. By maintaining distinctions between 
their criminal and mental health laws, states more effectively 
address the serious problem of sexual violence without eroding 
their legal authority in each system. 
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